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Animal Grief 
Abstract 
Numerous scientific studies and non-scientific works document diverse nonhuman animal species 
exhibiting distress and grief-like behaviour at the loss of proximal subjects (significant others). The 
inability of humans to inhabit other animals’ minds and feelings, including the experience of grief, often 
translates into negation of nonhuman animals’ possession of such capacities, or of different levels of 
them. This paper reviews and synthesises scientific evidence from neuropsychological and biological 
sources that predict nonhuman animals’ capacity for grief and feelings of profound loss, and establish 
that the core of these feelings for all animals, including humans, is attachment and the consequent 
separation distress. In exploring objections commonly raised by commentators of animal grief to 
ascribing a human-comparable grief dimension to nonhuman animals, the paper identifies several issues 
that need further consideration in trans-species grief studies. These include the widespread yet 
unfounded assumption of homogeneity/consensus in the understanding of key grief and death-related 
philosophical questions within the human species, and the debated over-emphasis of ‘higher’ cognitive 
processes in emotion-related issues – which in the case of grief studies tends to result in the underrating 
of the experience of separation distress. 
This journal article is available in Animal Studies Journal: https://ro.uow.edu.au/asj/vol2/iss2/5 
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Abstract: Numerous scientific studies and non-scientific works document diverse nonhuman animal 
species exhibiting distress and grief-like behaviour at the loss of proximal subjects (significant others). 
The inability of humans to inhabit other animals’ minds and feelings, including the experience of 
grief, often translates into negation of nonhuman animals’ possession of such capacities, or of 
different levels of them. This paper reviews and synthesises scientific evidence from 
neuropsychological and biological sources that predict nonhuman animals’ capacity for grief and 
feelings of profound loss, and establish that the core of these feelings for all animals, including 
humans, is attachment and the consequent separation distress. In exploring objections commonly 
raised by commentators of animal grief to ascribing a human-comparable grief dimension to 
nonhuman animals, the paper identifies several issues that need further consideration in trans-species 
grief studies. These include the widespread yet unfounded assumption of homogeneity/consensus in 
the understanding of key grief and death-related philosophical questions within the human species, 
and the debated over-emphasis of ‘higher’ cognitive processes in emotion-related issues – which in 
the case of grief studies tends to result in the underrating of the experience of separation distress.  





Nonhuman animals of diverse species have widely been observed exhibiting affective behaviour 
at the death of a proximal subject. Additionally, there are equally numerous descriptions of 
nonhuman animals seeming to perform rituals, including burials, at the death of both 
conspecifics (i.e. organisms belonging to the same species) and members of other species. 
 Neurobiological and ethological evidence aside, scientists and other commentators 
remain cautious in ascribing a human-comparable grief dimension to nonhuman animals. Such 
cautiousness is based mainly on the uncertainty of nonhuman animals’ awareness of death and 
their own mortality. It also appears to spring from the inaccurate position that there is universal 
consent within the human species itself on the substance of such awareness.    
 Here, I first review and discuss the scientific evidence – specifically the 
neuropsychological foundations that predict nonhuman animals have the capacity for grief and 
feelings of profound loss. This can be argued to support and be congruent with ethological 
observations. Then, I explore psychosocial mechanisms that permit the disjunct between 
scientific evidence and public and scientific perception of nonhuman animal emotional 
capacities. I conclude that for a more accurate consideration of nonhuman animals’ grief, it 
should be discussed within the heterogeneity of humans’ own perceptions of death and related 
grief experiences, as opposed to positing the kind of dubious homogeneity of human experience 
which might be loosely described as the perspective of the modern day secular human.  
 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s human mental health studies moved from observing (and attempting to 
correct) external maladaptive behaviour to focusing on internal cognitive processes (Schore, Art 
of Psychotherapy 4). The dominance of a cognitive paradigm in human psychotherapy resulted 
in the emergence of cognitive-behavioural therapy models that were oriented towards changing 
an individual’s conscious cognition, i.e. maladaptive thoughts and beliefs (Schore, Art of 
Psychotherapy 4, 11). The association of the neocortex with traditionally greatly valued higher 
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cognitive functions – some of which are arguably exclusively human – combined with the long 
held prejudice against emotions as something inferior to logic, something which needed to be 
suppressed, has to date kept the Cartesian divide alive. The latter has not only ‘plagued 
psychiatry and psychology’ (Schore, Art of Psychotherapy 4) to the detriment of human 
wellbeing, but has also consolidated a conceptual divide between humans and other animals, a 
divide which is progressively losing theoretical and empirical ground.  
 The idea of emotions playing a positive role in normative functioning, including in the 
reasoning process, proposed by Damasio (Descartes’ Error), has been largely embraced despite 
some initial scepticism. Furthermore, cumulative evidence suggests an evolutionary continuum 
of emotional feeling with the foundational, causal level lying in subcortical regions, where cross-
species homologies abound (Low et al.). Contrary to traditional views according to which 
feelings, and the mind generally, are a product of the cerebral cortex (Panksepp, ‘Neural 
Nature’160; Damasio, Self 75) the data from observations of pertinent human cases and 
invasive, ethically unsustainable research on nonhuman animals, suggest subcortical generation 
of basic affective consciousness (Damasio, Self 75).1 This affective consciousness is also an 
indispensable component of the self and a rudimentary signal to the mind of the existence of its 
organism as alive (Damasio, Self 75–76). 
 Far from being close to the resolution of the myriad of questions that the intricate fabric 
of consciousness poses (see e.g. Velmans and Schneider), the integration of bodily based 
emotions into the formulation following cumulative evidence of the inseparability of biological 
and psychological processes should inform, Schore (Art of Psychotherapy) urges, the 
development of new therapeutic models for human conditions as well as preventive measures. 
Such integration provides a solid foundation for the emergence of trans-species psychology 
(Bradshaw ‘Elephant Trauma’ and Elephants on the Edge; Bradshaw and Watkins). In 
recognition of growing evidence that like biology, psychology is also conserved across species 
(Bradshaw and Sapolsky), this field of psychology employs a holistic view of the individual 
animal (human-inclusive), both in prevention and treatment of psychological trauma.  
 Nevertheless, nonhuman animals’ psyches and feelings remain controversial in some 
circles. While humans admit to other humans the capacity to love, nonhumans are often only 
admitted the capacity to form social bonds; humans can be depressed, nonhumans can be 
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stressed. Albeit, paradoxically, nonhuman animals’ ability to be stressed and express 
depression(-like) symptoms is being exploited, among other things, in research on 
antidepressants for humans. Similarly, when discussing the abundance of ethological 
observations of grief(-like) expressions in nonhuman animals, attributions of a human-
comparable dimension of grief to nonhuman animals are not readily admitted. Instead, the 
questions most commonly raised in assessing nonhuman animals’ experience and its 
comparability to human experience relate to the cognitive paradigm. But they presuppose a 
cognitive-experiential uniformity in regard to death and grief within the human species, which 
does not exist. The consideration of grief in nonhuman animals inevitably leads to questions of 
nonhuman animals’ awareness of their own mortality and signifiers of death, which are of 
secondary relevance as the human cross-cultural context itself demonstrates. The primary 
parameter of consideration in claims about animal grief should instead be the animals’ capacity 
to experience attachment and loss, a subject which rarely ever receives adequate attention.  
 Attachment within social groups for many animal species, humans included, translates 
into survival, and to a certain extent determines quality of life. The early socio-environmentally 
embedded formative period is not only important for the acquisition of ethological (social) and 
ecological (food, etc.) knowledge, it also shapes the individual’s affective and self-regulatory 
systems and the development of stress responses (Orosz and Bradshaw) as well as being 
associated with the early development of the self (Schore, ‘Attachment’ 205). The caregiver 
effectively serves as an external regulator of the infant’s bio-behavioural modulation, which 
plays a critical role for the ripening emotion processing limbic circuits and the development of 
affective and neuro-endocrinological self-regulation (Schore, ‘Attachment’; Bradshaw and 
Schore). Schore writes: 
[T]he adult’s and infant’s individual homeostatic systems are linked in a superordinate 
organization that allows for mutual regulation of vital endocrine, autonomic, and central 
nervous systems of both mother and infant by elements of their interaction with each 
other. (207)  
In rats, for example, the infant’s homeostatic system remains open to the mother’s bio-
regulatory influence even after the infant has begun to consume solid foods and is capable of 
surviving on her/his own (Hofer, ‘Relationships’). Social attachments and dependencies 
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continue all through life, and are beneficial both physically and mentally (Panksepp, 
Neuroscience 262). Conversely, loss as an interruption of the attachment reality can have an 
equally potent impact on an individual.  
 When, in a discussion of nonhuman animal grief, attachment-related separation anxiety 
is brought in, it is difficult to overlook the implied assumption of the feebleness of this emotion. 
Archer, for example, who believes that nonhuman animals have no awareness of the 
irreversibility of death, argues that human children and nonhuman animals are capable of 
separation distress, such as that experienced by human adults, but the distress reactions 
exhibited by adults when separated from a loved one ‘differ in important ways from the grief 
that occurs when the separation is understood to be permanent as a result of death’ (Archer 
265). Setting aside the picturesque fabric of adult humans’ reactions and understandings of 
death, which will be discussed below, it is distinctly unclear where nonhuman animals and 
human children might derive the notion of the possible reversibility of separation. This 
proposition appears to be implied when separation anxiety is accorded a lesser valence than  
the ‘real’ grief potentially experienced by adult humans who understand such departure  
as irreversible.  
 Parkes, a long-time researcher of human grief, points out that one of the problems with 
discussing and analysing grief is the lack of an accepted definition of grief (Parkes 29–30). 
Variables such as anger, self-reproach, depression and others which can accompany grief are not 
part of grief itself and might occur following a number of other stressful life events and 
circumstances. Hence, he proposes that the essential components for grief are: 
the experience of a loss and a reaction of intense pining and yearning for the object lost 
(separation anxiety). Without these a person cannot truly be said to be grieving (30).  
Separation distress, which can manifest in innumerable conscious and unconscious ways, appears 
to represent valid common ground for discussing grief in both human cross-cultural and trans-
species contexts.  
 To better understand the implications of separation anxiety it is helpful to go beyond (in 
effect beneath) the generalising and hence perhaps misleadingly abstract notion of affective 
response to stress, and consider instead that diverse mechanisms are involved in the attachment 
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interactions, which are directly affected by the broken bond (Hofer, ‘Roots’). The infant-
caregiver dyad is of particular and vital relevance in terms of the infant’s psychobiological and 
more broadly social development (Schore, Art of Psychotherapy). The caregiver’s presence does 
not only help to regulate the infant’s physiology generally. The mother-infant interactions in 
various animal species affect a myriad of specific physiological mechanisms ranging from heart-
rate to growth hormones to sleep patterns (Hofer, ‘Roots’). The infant’s system has the 
potential to collapse with the withdrawal of this multimodal support. Attempts at repair to 
promote recovery and healing would have to be able to address this regulatory variety.  
 Importantly, the homeostatic regulatory effects of various forms of input from the social 
environment are not limited to support for infantile organisms, but appear to pertain to adult 
animals as well. In all likelihood a completely independent regulation never develops, not even 
in adulthood (Hofer, ‘Relationships’), an observation which has obvious implications for adult 
grief. Individuals living in social groups develop synchronised cardinal rhythms and when moved 
to a different group they adapt to the new group’s rhythms (Hofer, ‘Relationships’). When 
social cues are withdrawn or heavily diminished, individuals’ biological rhythms appear to 
desynchronise, with a potentially negative effect on homeostasis as well as on adaptive 
functioning (Hofer, ‘Relationships’). Furthermore, individuals deprived of customary 
environmental input, for example in solitary confinement, exhibit several of the symptoms 
linked to the experience of grief following the loss of a loved one (Hofer, ‘Relationships’). 
Socio-environmental cues appear to play a meaningful role in the regulation of internal rhythmic 
cycles, and since a companion may constitute a significant part of an animal’s socio-
environmental fabric and contribute substantially to its dynamics, the sudden withdrawal of 
these cues, for instance following permanent separation due to death, could, as Hofer proposes, 
lead to desynchronisation with more or less severe negative outcomes.  
 This is another facet of grief, which is unrelated to ‘higher’ cognitive capacities and 
which might play a critical role in nonhuman animals’ coping with loss in their social network. 
Like the attunement between infant and caregiver (Schore, Art of Psychotherapy), adult animals 
may also develop attunement and synchronisation between proximal subjects, mediated through 
various senses, such as smell, touch and vision. An optimal dynamic positively affects 
psychobiological regulation by providing either stimulation or modulation of arousal levels 
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(Field). This can prevent aversive under- or over-stimulation, keeping the individual in the 
optimal arousal zone (Field). Conversely, separation between bonded individuals leaves the 
animal without a co-regulator, with effects on psycho-bio-behavioural outcomes. 
 
 
Elephants are one of the few nonhuman animal species that have been observed engaging in what 
can be taken to be explicit death rituals, which include covering the deceased body with 
branches and dirt, lifting and manipulating the bones of relatives, and returning to them 
(Bradshaw, Elephants, 10–13). Magpies have been observed bringing grass and laying it beside a 
dead conspecific, then standing as if in vigil for a few seconds before flying off (Bekoff). Similar 
scenes have been witnessed with ravens and crows (Derbyshire).  
 Accounts of other nonhuman animals exhibiting signs of deep grief at the death of a 
proximal subject are not unusual, and they include chicks, cows (Hatkoff), pigs and many other 
species. A substantial collection of stories of nonhuman animals grieving appears in Barbara 
King’s recent book How Animals Grieve.  
 Expressions of loss and grief have also been observed in different cetacean species. For 
example, in 2010 Robin Baird from Cascadia Research reported watching a killer whale carrying 
a dead calf for over six hours.2 On 24 September 2012 the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera 
published on their website video evidence of a pilot whale engaging in an activity with a dead 
calf similar to that described earlier. Ecologist Paolo Galli observed that the physical degradation 
of the calf could indicate that the adult’s interaction with the infant had lasted for several days 
and nights.  
 Bottlenose dolphins appear to react differently to sudden, unexpected death, than to a 
death that has speculatively been labelled as predictable. In one case, for example, a mother 
stayed with her dead newborn calf for two days, calling to, touching and lifting the infant’s 
corpse above the water surface. In a second instance a two or three months old dolphin, bearing 
bleach marks as a possible result of exposure to pesticides or heavy metals, was having 
difficulties swimming. Other dolphins tried to help the dying individual stay afloat but with little 
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success. Death occurred an hour later. Contrary to the researcher’s expectation based on past 
experience, the mother this time did not stay nearby, and instead, as soon as the sick dolphin 
died, the corpse was allowed to sink and the group left the area (Hooper).  
 Cases of an animal’s grief ending with his or her own death are also known. One such 
example is Damini, an elephant in an Indian zoo, reported by BBC News on 6 May 1999 as 
having starved herself to death after her friend had died in childbirth. A similar episode almost 
occurred at the Edgar’s Mission Farm Sanctuary in Australia, in 2010. When Daisy, a pig, died, 
her close companion, Alice, lay on her grave for two days and nights, refusing to eat or move 
(Ahern, personal communication).  
 Such accounts unavoidably stimulate the interest of scientists and non-scientists alike. 
Most of the time, however, the issue is not explored. Instead, it is avoided – in effect dismissed 
– by asking potentially unanswerable philosophical questions, such as: Do nonhuman animals 
understand death? Do they know they are mortal? Can they really grieve? These questions are 
normally accompanied by explicit or implicit reminders of the ‘dangers’ of anthropomorphising. 
Such rhetoric gives ample space to translate the privacy argument – according to which 
conscious experiences can only be known by the individual who experiences them (Griffin 492) 
– into negation of nonhuman animal grief. Additionally, the implicit message it conveys is that 
even if nonhuman animals might feel something at the loss of a proximal subject, it obviously 
cannot measure to humans’ grief, given that humans can answer positively to the questions 
above, or so it is assumed, while other animals cannot. This becomes particularly problematic 
when even apparent animal ‘lovers’, in the pursuit of ‘intellectual rigour’, explicitly though 
without any sound foundation ignore the privacy argument by stating: ‘They [elephants] can’t 
anticipate death in the way we can or imagine it as an abstract concept’ (Honeyborne). This is 
incorrect; in reality, humans simply don’t know.  
 
 
The emotional detachment and rationality cherished by a dominant scientific and philosophical 
approach as a primary means to factual knowledge is unlikely to be effective as a sole approach 
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to truth. ‘The nature of attention one brings to bear on anything alters what one finds. (…) To 
attempt to detach oneself entirely is just to bring a special kind of attention to bear which will 
have important consequences for what we find’ (McGilchrist 29). Science and its presumed 
objectivity as well as philosophy and its presumed rationality are equally value-laden forms of 
attentiveness, other ways of looking at things, chosen premises upon which neutral cognitive 
functions build a truth, a truth that, unlike the cognitive functions, is in itself never neutral, 
always compromised (McGilchrist 28). 
 A powerful factor in the shaping of our attentiveness is the ‘mere exposure’ effect. The 
mere exposure effect describes a psychological phenomenon, vastly used and abused in 
advertising, by which the exposure to stimuli determines one’s drives. The more one is exposed 
to stimuli and thus becomes familiar with them, the more one likes them and becomes attached 
to them, particularly if exposure is accompanied by positive experience or at least by the 
absence of negative ones (Panksepp, Neuroscience 259). Exposure-determined attraction has 
been documented as valid for all the animals who have been studied, and ranges from food to 
places and even to ideas. It is not uncommon for humans exposed to certain ideas to begin to 
prefer those ideas over unfamiliar ones proposed by others, and often eagerly to contradict the 
latter prior to seriously considering them (Panksepp 259). A study by Gallate and colleagues 
addresses the statistically unwarranted association of Arabs and terrorists in mainstream Western 
psyches, media-fuelled and exacerbated after 9/11. Researchers managed to reduce the 
prejudicial score of the tested (human) subjects via non-invasive brain stimulation. While the 
neural basis for prejudice remains relatively unknown, prejudice seems to sit comfortably within 
the context of the highly automatic categorisation processes in the brain (Gallate et al.). The 
latter can be beneficial in simplifying the complexities of the world, yet quite detrimental when 
oversimplification and overgeneralisation occur with prejudicial segregation as a result (Gallate 
et al.). As the Arab-terrorist association example illustrates, and as indicated earlier, reasoning 
processes are not exempt from the influence of the environment, including the mere exposure 
effect: indeed, quite the opposite. Mere exposure can clearly shape the conceptual and 
emotional framework, determining to a certain extent what one sees, how one sees it, and how 
one acts in relation to themselves, conspecifics, other species and the rest of ‘nature’.  
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 The Western dualistic view is a case in point – an acquired concept and far from 
universal, as Audrey Shenandoah, American Indian Onondaga clan mother indicated at the 
Moscow Global forum for the environment and development for survival in 1990. In her 
keynote address Shenandoah explained to the audience that in her language there was no word 
for what is generally referred to as ‘nature’; nature seems to imply something which is separate 
from humans, but since her tradition and people are as one with the environment, such a 
distinction is  unknown (Lacourt, quoting Wall and Arden).  
 Anthropomorphism is heavily scrutinised in current Western academic discourse. 
Occam’s razor is still a first principle, even though it has been strongly criticised by many for 
engendering reductionist views. These include the consideration of nonhuman animals as 
automata and denying human babies the feeling of pain (Broom 5–6). If a phenomenon can be 
explained by ‘lower’ capacities (e.g. learned adjustment) we are discouraged from going 
‘higher’ (e.g. by suggesting cognitive empathy) (de Waal 64). This does not mean that the 
‘simple’ explanation is correct, nor does it mean that it is more correct than a complex one 
would be. It only means that convention favours an unwarranted, highly separatist view in 
regard to different others, and mere exposure has brought a number of humans to fear 
anthropomorphism on a level comparable to some humans’ fear of Arabs.  
 The potential futility of any kind of ego-morphising is undeniable. Yet individuals’ lives 
are replete with relationships with humans and other animals. The existence and quality of these 
relationships depend entirely on an individuals’ ability to decode and encode the messages that 
the mass of cells and tissue in front of them – in human or other form, and often, though not 
always, accompanied by vocal cord activity – is attempting to convey.     
 To this end, and drawing on the Self as a generatively and ontologically relational entity, 
I would like to propose embedding anthropomorphism in its crude form as a necessary bridge to 
other animal subjects into the larger matrix of what seems valid to term intra-zoomorphism, 
considering that humans, too, belong to the animal kingdom. Intra-zoomorphism encompasses 
both inter- and intra-species ‘morphising’,3 including, for example, inter-cultural ‘morphising’, 
inter-gender ‘morphising’, and inter-personal ‘morphising’. The inevitability of inter-
relationships between different Others compels the subjects involved to formulate ways of 
negotiating these relationships. Of course, humans are not the only animals to encounter 
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otherness. If we maintain the position that we can only see the world through our own ‘eyes’ – 
without denying ourselves and others the necessary space which enables more or less successful 
interaction – the same must be true for other species. This capacity of identification and 
projection takes the form of nurturing bonds between different animal species. In  
Unlikely Friendships Jennifer Holland documents a number of supposedly unusual  
inter-species relationships. 
 A less unusual, in fact very common, example of intra-zoomorphism can be observed in 
the communication between nonhuman animals and their companion humans in domestic 
situations. When my dog starts nudging me around 4pm every day it is legitimate for me to 
assume that he is doing so in the conviction that I will understand that it is time for his walk. 
Stuart Watt refers to his cat’s gestural language while interacting with him as a member of the 
cat’s social group as a possible instance of ailuromorphism.4 Marc Bekoff coins the term 
dogomorphism (reported in Horowitz and Bekoff), referring to canine self-projections such as 
those demonstrated in a study of dogs and dog-like robots (Kubinyi et al.). In this study dogs 
only considered the robots covered in fur as potential social partners.5 Before rushing to 
unjustified conclusions, it is worth pointing out that dogs are not the only animals who might be 
misled by robots. A 2007 study revealed that the human mirror reaction is activated without 
significant difference by the sight of both human and robotic actions (Gazzola et al.). 
Mirror neurons6 are brain cells that make one salivate while watching somebody eating an ice-
cream, and which can break one’s heart at the sight of a mother cow trying to prevent her baby 
from being taken away so that the ice-cream could be produced in the first place. Mirror 
neurons fire during both the execution and the observation of a performed action. Nicknamed 
‘empathy neurons’ (Ramachandran), mirror neurons might provide the biological base for the 
tendency to ego-morphise.      
 Of course one cannot rely on mirror neurons to provide an unequivocal indication of 
the emotive and mental states of other animals (human conspecifics included). However, it 
would be equally naïve to assume the absence of such capacities based on the fact that nonhuman 
animals do not speak human languages and hence cannot communicate such states in a way that 
is to humans ‘beyond doubt’. To return to Damasio’s point, reasoning and decision making, 
including categorisation processes, can be equally compromised by the absence of emotion, as 
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would be the case if emotions were given complete carte blanche. The capacity to identify to a 
certain extent with other animals on emotional and other levels should be viewed as a most 
welcome window of opportunity to understand ourselves and the world around better, rather 
than as a threat to rationality. The learned conceptual barrier, which the dualistic view has 
forced upon the Western world over centuries, does not appear any less damaging to the 
integrity of thought and perception than radical anthropomorphism.  
 
 
The theory and observation of attachment and loss in humans and other animals leaves little 
reason to doubt that what is experienced is similar. Yet to feel grief as death-related loss, one 
would have to have some kind of awareness of death. The question ‘Do they understand death?’, 
which is commonly asked in discussions of nonhuman animal’s exhibitions of grieving behaviour, 
is in effect a composite of two sub-questions/sub-issues. The first sub-issue concerns their  
ability to understand what I will call the physical non-returnability of the (dead) subject, and 
physical non-returnability is what I refer to when I use the term ‘death’ in this discussion.  
The second concerns their ability to understand their own mortality, considered part of  
reflective consciousness.  
 It is not uncommon for humans to question nonhuman animals’ ability to recognise 
death when encountered. Such questions were raised, for example, when chimpanzee mothers 
carrying their dead infants were studied in the Republic of Guinea (Biro et al.), and when 
Japanese macaque mothers engaging in the same activity were studied in Southern Japan 
(Sugiyama et al.). However, it seems more credible, given the regular occurrence of death and 
animals’ regular experience of dead organisms, to consider the awareness or recognition of 
death as part of what has been termed phylogenetic knowledge. Phylogenetic knowledge is long 
term knowledge, acquired over generations and mediated by changes in the DNA, while 
ontogenetic knowledge is short-term knowledge, acquired during life and mediated by changes 
in the nervous and immune systems (Århem and Liljenström 4–5). Phylogenetically-based 
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recognition of death and its benefits for survival would, in fact, make good evolutionary sense 
for both so-called prey and predator species. 
 Ants are interesting in this regard. Ants obviously recognise death, as they pile their 
dead conspecifics in what could be referred to as ants’ cemeteries. Ants, being olfactory 
creatures, recognise death when they detect the smell of triglycerides (Hirshon). Wilson reports 
amusedly watching a live ant whom he had covered with the death-chemical being carried to the 
cemetery by other ants who believed her dead, ignoring her other signs of life, such as limb 
movements. Considering ants’ olfactory dependence, this comes as no surprise. Creatures with 
underdeveloped olfactory consciousness, such as humans, rely on other information to establish 
an organism’s death: immobility, for example, may be one of the first signals. Like Wilson, ants 
themselves might be amused if they learnt about the medical staff, who, unable to rely on their 
meagre olfactory abilities, proclaimed a human baby dead when he wasn’t (Inbar). Following 
unsuccessful revival attempts by medical staff, it was the nursing method known as ‘kangaroo 
mother care’ or ‘skin to skin care’ which enabled the baby to live. Kangaroo mother care is a 
useful technique in places where incubators are not readily available, and obviously elsewhere, 
and might constitute part of the phylogenetic knowledge of the chimpanzees and macaques 
discussed earlier, especially considering the already indicated bioregulatory importance of such 
interactions within the dyad. The occasional prolonged carrying of the dead infant to the point 
when the baby mummified seems more likely to be a sign of the mother’s psychological distress 
and inability to accept the infant’s death than a sign that nonhuman animals generally might not 
recognise death. 
 Barrett and Behne, studying human children’s recognition of death in a cross-cultural 
context, propose the existence of an early-developing core architecture which they call the 
agency system, that helps children discriminate between living organisms and dead ones. The 
researchers found that based on the agency criteria (agent being defined as an ‘object capable of 
acting in a goal-directed fashion’) children understand the concept of the irreversibility of death 
by age four. Previously it had been assumed that children could not grasp irreversibility until 
they are six or seven years old. Given the latter figures and the widespread notion – redolent of 
conceptual and methodological problems – that no other animal reaches the cognitive level of a 
five-year-old human child, Archer (265) dismisses the possibility of nonhuman animals’ 
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awareness of the irreversibility of death altogether. However, Barrett and Behne correctly point 
out that children might develop an understanding of death as cessation of agency before the age 
of four, and that studies of this kind, including studies of the theory of mind, are always 
problematic as they are dependent on other acquired skills, such as language. 
 The question of nonhuman animals’ awareness of their own mortality, on the other 
hand, is of a far more speculative nature: it would be as incorrect to posit that nonhuman 
animals are unaware of their mortality as it is to claim they are aware of it. While the question 
may never be resolved, the increasing evidence for nonhuman animals’ capacities for anticipation 
and bi-directional mental time travel (Roberts), accompanied by their capacity to experience 
learned (as opposed to only phylogenetic) fear, and the fact that death has been a recurrent 
phenomenon in most animals’ lives and environments, suggest that the possibility of such 
abstract thoughts in nonhuman animals should not be automatically ruled out. 
 Nevertheless, humans’ awareness of mortality appears to play a lesser role in the 
capacity to experience grief than it is often implied when considering nonhuman animal grief, 
and lack of awareness of mortality certainly does not preclude the feeling of grief. The human 
notion of mortality hardly bears the unanimous consensus that it is often credited with in 
discussions of human versus nonhuman animals’ grief. Arguably, the numerous humans whose 
religious feelings give them internal certainty of a new, even better, life after physical death, do 
not appear to understand death and their own mortality in the way that secular Western thought 
postulates when raising arguments against nonhuman animals’ grief. Is the grief experienced by 
these supposedly immortal humans at the loss of a proximal subject less acute than the grief of 
those humans who believe that their entire persona dies when the body capitulates? Does the 
certainty some humans hold of a reunion with the beloved after the physical death preclude 
grief? Should these potentially immortal humans be denied the full extension of the feeling of 
grief based on their apparent certainty of eternal life? If the answer is negative – without 
necessarily dismissing possible variations on the theme – and in consideration of the potential 
impact of separation distress per se, denying nonhuman animals a human-comparable grief 
dimension appears premature to say the least.  
 Nonhuman animal grief may be more appropriately studied within a broader trans-
species and trans-cultural context, in which nonhuman animals would represent another 
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(obviously very large and diverse) cultural group that is potentially not aware of their own 
mortality. It is on this basis, as I currently see it, that nonhuman animal grief can begin to be 
assessed without sinking into unnecessary and potentially damaging speciesism. 
 Another issue to consider in grief studies is the ‘ease of identification’ fallacy, which is 
twofold: firstly, dismissing from consideration animals with whom humans cannot easily 
identify; and secondly, dismissing from consideration animals who do not exhibit grief-like 
behaviour that is identifiable to humans. 
 Invertebrates represent an interesting case in question. Without necessarily attributing 
the experience of grief to invertebrates, it would be equally erroneous to a priori dismiss this 
possibility on the basis, for example, that expressions of grief have not yet been identified in 
invertebrates, or that science has not yet officially confirmed their capacity for attachment. A 
2011 study (Mendl, Paul and Chittka) suggests that bees are capable of emotional responses, 
while the story of ants liberating a nestmate from a nylon snare she was trapped in, running the 
risk of harming themselves, demonstrates cognitive and behavioural complexity (Nowbahari et 
al.), and possibly also altruism.  
Different species’ traditions could, in fact – for various reasons, including sanitation – explicitly 
prohibit any kind of interaction with cadavers. Certain human societies forbid pronouncing the 
name of the dead person. There is no guarantee that equivalent and perhaps more stringent 
practices – i.e. cultural lack of acceptance of any kind of expression of grief that humans might 
recognise – do not exist in other animal groups. Such absences do not necessarily indicate a lack 
of grief, just as the lack of vocalisations in injured animals is no guarantee that they are not in 
pain – an assumption which might lead humans to believe that mulesing, for instance, is not 
painful because during the procedure lambs don’t cry (Broom and Fraser 63).  
 In the human fraction of the animal kingdom, practices including but not limited to 
senicide and ‘delayed personhood’ point to heterogeneity within the human species itself, which 
often gets overlooked in the discourse. In 2010 the Indian weekly Tehelka Magazine brought 
thalaikoothal to public attention. Referred to as ‘mercy killing’ by the locals, thalaikoothal in 
essence describes the killing of elderly people by their children when the latter feel that their 
situations do not allow them to look after their elderly parents properly, and/or the caring for 
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the parents would endanger their own and their children’s survival (Shahina). Delayed 
personhood, which would be equally legitimate to term delayed attachment, on the other hand, 
has been observed in human societies with high infant mortality and a generally adverse 
environment, and refers to the practice of considering infants not fully human due to the 
uncertainty of their survival and fulfilment of the expected role (Lancy, ‘Parenting’). The 
emotional distancing, which sometimes extends even to delaying naming the infant for a certain 
period, aims at protecting the family from the burden of grief (Lancy, ‘Babies’, quoting Bugos 
and McCarthy). The seeming ease and lack of emotional involvement with which senicide is 
carried out, or the purposive detachment in relation to infants in other societies gives little 
indication of the actual emotional impact of such acts on those who are forced by circumstances 
to perform them. Cultural outsiders are likely to regard these actions with horror while being 
completely oblivious of the environmental – including social – pressure surrounding the 
decision. Chippewa mothers, for example, are urged to abstain from weeping at an infant’s 
death to prevent the grief being passed on to the next child. The discouragement of mourning 
for the as yet unnamed child in Tongan culture is instantiated by the older women explaining to 
the bereaved mother that she should silence her lament as the child was a ghost (Lancy, ‘Babies’, 
quoting Hilger, and Reynolds).  
 A lack of understanding of different attitudes to death in human societies can inhibit 
Western understandings of differing practices in immigrant communities.7 An Egyptian woman 
complying with the culturally prescribed lengthy period of mourning for her dead child 
(Rosenblatt 41), for instance, could quickly be diagnosed with a pathological condition by 
Western clinicians, while a Chippewa mother who might show no apparent grief at the death of 
her baby could easily be seen as a psychopath. The sensitivity with which loss is approached in an 
animal community – human or not – could and should never be considered excessive. 
Assumptions such as ‘We humans don’t erupt into displays of aggression around dead bodies as 
chimpanzees may’ proposed by King (147) in her otherwise informative book, need greater 
consideration. In a broader human context, in fact, mourning expressions which may not be 
considered acceptable in the sterile environment of Western mortuaries are not uncommon, 
including for instance extreme crying, breast beating and scratching of the face, reported for 
some human cultures (Jonker 154).  
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 Additionally, it may be worth considering that most nonhuman animals do not have the 
privilege of living in the comfort and safety that affluent Western society currently offers. 
Instead they generally live in severely adverse conditions, either as victims of human exploitation 
or as victims of human greed leading to ‘destruction of habitat’ – the passive and euphemistic 
phrase commonly used for their potential or actual extermination. The expression of grief (not 
necessarily grief itself) could in fact be seen as a privilege, which many human and nonhuman 
animals might not be able to afford. 
 
 
The complexity of the issues surrounding animal grief is not easy to disentangle. Each 
experience of grief is unique as is each relationship animals form with others. An individual’s 
developmental and living condition, the nature of the lost relationship, and the circumstances of 
the loss are but a few of the factors affecting responses to the death of a proximal subject for 
humans and nonhumans alike. The scant opportunities humans have to observe such responses in 
nonhuman animals, as well as the diversity of response to death in both human and nonhuman 
animal societies, call for caution in dismissing the possibility of wide spread grief in nonhuman 
animals, according it only sporadic occurrence and anecdotal value. The neural substrates for 
conscious and affective states humans share with other species, the shared physical and mental 
significance of attachment relationships, the complex social structures and interpersonal 
relationships many animals construct and nurture, suggest that grief might be a constituent part 
of nonhuman animals’ lives just as it is of humans’. To better understand the implications of such 
loss in nonhuman societies a more emic – i.e. species/culture specific – approach is needed. 
Current generalisations based on the contemporary secular understanding of death have proven 
fruitless, in fact damaging, in the discussion of nonhuman animal grief. While none of the 
present or past human societies can serve as a direct model for the study of nonhuman animals’ 
responses to death and grief, their diverse nature can help to shed light on numerous implicated 
issues and advance this significant area of inquiry. Regardless of the potential economic impact, 
nonhuman animals’ physical and mental wellbeing is an ethical issue and as such it demands 
serious consideration and appropriate action.  
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1 This is not denying the importance of the entirety of the brain for general adaptive as well as 
maladaptive functioning. 
2 Baird’s notification is available from: http://www.orcanetwork.org/sightings/sept10.html. 
Accessed on 20 September 2013.  
3 Projection of one’s characteristics as an individual or group to other individuals/groups. 
4 From ailouros – Greek for ‘cat’. 
5 Kubinyi and colleagues believe that robots are a viable option for future research in animal 
behaviour, and in their final remarks indirectly encourage invasive experiments with robot-
‘raised’ dog litters – by removing the pups from their mother and limiting the pups’ social 
experience to robots – reminiscent of the atrocities psychologist Harry Harlow subjected baby 
rhesus monkeys to. 
6 These neurons were first discovered in the early 1990s in macaque monkeys but the 
electrophysiological evidence for their existence in humans was delivered only recently (Keysers 
and Gazzola). 
7 In 1997, Parkes, Laungani and Young brought out a book (Death and Bereavement across 
Cultures) on mourning practices across major world religions and a number of small scale 
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